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The diagnostic and therapeutic approach to the patient is always charged
with responsibility and tension for the physician and with expectations and
fear for the patient. This is experienced in a more difficult and painful way
when the patient has a neoplastic pathology of the gynecological sphere.
There is the fear of having cancer and the uncertainty of the outcome of the
therapy. There is also the pain of undergoing a mutilation of organs
considered fundamental for the structure and recognition of one's female
identity, with the consequent incapacity to procreate or other difficulties if
the woman is pregnant.
In these cases, one asks the physician to use not only his scientific
competence, but also his humanity, so the patient can deal with this sad
experience. Also in these cases, as in the whole practice of medicine, the
physician and the patient cannot ignore that the decisions regarding clinical
management involve fundamental ethical values regarding the human
person, her life and her health.
If we analyze the bioethicalliterature on the subject, we find that the
solution to difficult or conflicting situations which arise in clinical practice
is often looked for with reference to principlism and, in particular, to the
principles of respect for autonomy and of beneficence. I In other words, the
physician-patient relationship is reduced to two opposing sides. On one
hand is the physician who, with his scientific knowledge, is able to identify
the most useful strategies of intervention for the woman. On the other hand
is the patient, with her expectations and convictions, but above all, with the
right to choose the path that she believes most suitable.
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In this context, the physician would act on the basis of the principle
of beneficence, and would not only commit himself to not harming the
patient (the principle of non-maleficence), but would also aim for the
greatest good for her. The clinical choice is thus the result of the balance
between possible risks and the expected benefits. However, one must also
take into consideration the choice made by the patient, who would act on
the basis of respect for her autonomy (recognition of moral autonomy, selfdetermination, freedom of conscience), which then becomes concrete in
the obligation of informed consent. Therefore, for the patient there are
obligations based on the principle of autonomy, whereas the physician
intervenes by virtue of the principle of beneficence.
At first glance, referring to the above-mentioned principles may
appear to be of great help in clinical practice. In reality, these principles are
often in conflict with each other and make it difficult to answer the
question "What should I do?" For example, if a woman, acting under the
principle of autonomy, decided to refuse necessary therapy, a physician
would not be able to act under the principle of beneficence to save her life.
The presence of this conflict should not surprise: it is the logical
consequence of the lack of a foundation of the principles themselves or, to
be more precise, of the presence of a double and contrasting foundation ,
which is utilitarian on one hand (What is useful to do ?) and deontological
on the other hand (What should I do ?).
The conflict inherent in principlism is even more obvious when the
clinical dilemmas concern not only the woman-physician dyad, but rather
the woman-fetus-physician triad. Which principle should oblige the
mother and the physician to act in the interest of the fetus?
Certainly not the principle of autonomy, since the fetus has not yet
acquired the capacity to make deci sions and to exercise his freedom; but
not even, it is said, the principle of beneficence unless the fetus can be
considered a "patient".2 And when can a fetus be considered a patient?
Only when, one reads in Cervenak and McCullough 's paper, "the
fetus has a good chance of becoming a child", or rather when it is in a
viable phase (at least 24 weeks of gestation). Consequently one denies that
the fetus may have subjective rights in any phase of his development and in
any condition: if, in fact, the fetus is not yet viable, it is the mother who
decides whether he should be considered a patient or not; if, however, the
fetus is already viable, the clinical decision, whether or not shared by the
mother, is to be taken by the physician in the interest of the fetu s.3
From what has been said, it is clear that there are some gaps in the
appeal to principilism: in the name of autonomy one ignores the source it
proceeds from, t at is the life that is its fundamental condition ; in the name
of beneficence one ignores the good of the patient. In order to resolve this
conflict, to respect the fundamental rights (to life and the protection of
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health) of all those involved, it is therefore necessary to think more deeply
and revisit the meaning of the terms "autonomy" and "good".4
First of all , in medicine the exercise of autonomy is not a monologue
but a dialogue. The autonomy of the patient "talks" to the autonomy of the
physician. The "subject" of the conversation is the good of the patient and,
if present, of the fetu s, a good that unites them and that also has to
overcome any personal interest. Moreover, what should one mean by
"good" ? According to Pellegrino and Thomasma, the "good" should
include: the biomedical good ; the concept that the patient has of his own
good; the good as the possibility of exerci sing hi s freedom; the ethical
good. And, if the first three dimensions of the good are already considered
by the principle of beneficence and by the principle of respect for
autonomy, it is the ontological dimension that has to be recovered, that of
being a "person" who, beyond his accidental or secondary qualities, asks
for respect and protection .
- Therefore, the autonomy of the patient and of the physician talk
about this good, for which they have to take responsibility. And it is
precisely in the ethics of responsibility that the autonomy of the patient and
of the physician meet the good they are born from and for which they live.
On the other hand, responsibility cannot be separated from autonomy: in
order to identify the ri sks, harm, advantages, that a human act - any
human act performed in a voluntary and free way - can produce on
nature, things, men, society. This responsibility is called on in the area of
gynecological oncology in at least three steps: in prevention, in the choice
of therapy and in assistance.

Prevention
It is a fact that in the aetiopathogenesis of gynecological tumors,
individual behavior, generically defined as "risky", plays an important
part, since it can be responsible for harming the patient's health, and in this
case, her life too.
It is enough to think about the association between cancer of the
cervix and HPV, contracted most frequently by women who began their
sexual activity at a young age (first sexual relationships between 15 and 17
years old) in conditions of promiscuity5.6.7; or of the association between
the consumption of tobacco (presence of NNK in the cervical mucus) and
cancer of the cervix 8 9 with reported non-progression of the histological
modifications after suspension. 'o
There is still the fear of a possible association - although the data
available do not always agree - between ovarian stimulation for
anovulation or in order to recover oocytes in artificial fertilization
August, 2003

185

protocols and epithelial ovarian cancer I I. 12. 13 , whose risk is already
increased in the presence of sterility 14, and breast cancer I5 •16 ; between HRT
(Hormone Replacement Therapy) epithelial ovarian cancer l 7 , breast cancer
and cancer of the endometrium l8 ; between the use of oral contraceptives
and breast cancer l9 , especially if taken from a very early age 20 ; between
early miscarriage or abortion and breast cancer. 2 I ,22,23
And although it is true that a particular behavior is not always
present in the aetiology of a cancerous pathology, having identified this
association in a high percentage of cases has to make one feel the moral
obligation to modify that behavior.
In fact, health should be understood as a sort of balance that
accompanies every day of one's life and that is to be sought after
continuously. Health is a job, a lifestyle. In this way, health is defined also
in relation to non-medical factors, which individual and collective choices
and behavior can also influence. It is in the light of this interpretation of the
concept of health that promotion and prevention become fundamental :
promoting and protecting health is, even more than a right, a moral
obligation.
However, what form of prevention should be carried out? Two
different strategies are proposed: the reduction of the risk in risky behavior
and health education.
Those who propose a strategy of reducing the risk in risky behavior
start from the presupposition that there are people who, despite the fact that
they know about and perceive the risk, in this case the oncogenous risk, of
certain behavior, consider this risk to be acceptable or, in any case, to be
taken. Preventive intervention should be limited to advice which can make
it possible for people to persist in that behavior but with the least possible
risk. It is obvious that this way one encourages the increasing lack of
responsibility of the person who practices this kind of behavior, since she
can continue to impose her choices. This is because there will always be
someone who is willing to suggest suitable means and short cuts, thereby
leading to the increasing lack of responsibility on the part of those who
should be performing prevention, and who have no interest in intervening
in order to remove the cause of this incongruous risk taking.
Having the "remedy" as the aim of health education but not
education itself is not enough. Real health education has to aim higher and
accompany the individual in taking responsibility and acquiring full
consciousness of what can improve his health and in making it possible for
him to make choices in favor of his life and freedom. Health education is
basically moral education. It asks for reasons for one certain type of
behavior rather than another one. It aims to teach people to separate needs
from desires and to help identify the jobs to be done to contribute to the
protection of one's own health, and that of others.
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As is known, prevention in gynecological oncology involves,
together with health education and early diagnosis, predictive genetic
tests24 and available options such as lifestyle changes, close follow-up,
chemoprevention 25 .26 , and even prophylactic surgery.
The use of predictive genetic tests presents the physician and the
patient with choices of great responsibility (i.e., informing the patient,
safeguarding confidentiality, the need to inform the patient's relatives
when they are equally at risk, the opportunity to perform tests during
prenatal life 27 ). There is also a difficult evaluation of the relationship
between risks and benefits, as for example in the experimental
administration of tamoxifen to healthy women.

The Therapeutic Choice
The therapeutic choice is also a moment of great and shared
responsibility: a choice that is usually based on the so-called therapeutic
proportionality. In fact, one opts for the intervention that is considered
necessary in order to save the patient's life and to improve her health.
This proportionality is sometimes difficult to evaluate. In addition to
the type of therapy, we consider the degree of difficulty and risks involved,
the economic and human costs of the treatment, the concrete possibilities
of carrying it out, the expected benefits and the patient's desire for quality
of life.28 In fact, it has been seen that only the patient, or if this is not
possible, the relatives and physicians, are able to evaluate the quality of her
life.29 .3o The difficulty is born of distorted and utilitarian interpretations
about the concept of quality of life.
In order to evaluate the proportionality of the therapies, an
appropriate, constant and truthful interaction of the patient with the
physician is necessary. In fact, without being able to count on the
professionalism of the doctor, the patient might not have the appropriate
technical or scientific knowledge to understand her situation. Without the
patient's input, and not sharing her experience, the physician might have
only a general technical opinion, which may not necessarily be relevant to
the patient's condition and therefore probably not "proportional" in the full
sense. Effective therapeutic choices that correspond with the personal
dignity of the sick person can only derive from a real therapeutic alliance
between the patient and the physician. Asking for a personal opinion in the
application of the principle of proportionality means assuming that the
patient and the physician are both able to understand the whole truth of the
person in the concrete situation. This will be possible only if they both try
and recognize the fundamental values of life and human dignity, starting
from an authentic way of judging in order to achieve a humanely
proportional therapeutic decision.
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From what has been said, it appears that each time the physician
wants to start therapy, he has to ask the patient for explicit and informed
consent. The patient will be able to decide freely and lawfully about those
interventions that have a risky and uncertain or serious outcome. However,
if she refuses necessary and valid interventions, she is not fulfilling her
duty to protect her life. If thi s happens, the patient's refusal cannot
automatically represent for the physician a lawful and sufficient criterion
for suspending the therapy, since he, too, is responsible for the patient's life
and not just for her options.
A shared choice, however, means that both the physician and the
patient should have the same information. This is a particularly difficult
situation if the patient is not fully cognizant of the seriousness of her
condition. What and how much of the truth should be communicated in
such cases? When and how should this be done?
This question has been fully discussed in the literature of
specialists,31which indicates, on one hand, the increasing need to inform (a
neoplastic pathology is no longer necessarily a fatal disease; control of the
disease often depends on the timeliness of the medical-surgical
intervention; knowing the diagnosis is necessary in order to start secondary
prevention interventions; the need is to start the patient on a clinical trial).
On the other hand, there is difficulty in finding a balance between
keeping quiet and communicating in a cold and impersonal way. In
general, one must recognize the priority of the patient's right to be
informed about her state of health, even if this ri ght to know has to be
modulated by the respect due to the person, that is, one has to be careful
that the information does not further jeopardize the patient's health. Thus,
the need to choose suitable words with respect to the circumstances, place,
and timing, bearing in mind that informing does not mean the end of the
physician-patient relationship: it is only the first step of a long, tiring and
painful path.

Pregnancy and Neoplasia: Is there a Mother-Fetus "Conflict"?
The choice of therapy is more complex when one has to intervene in
the presence of a pregnancy. Should the woman be treated as if she were
not pregnant, or is it necessary to bear in mind that there are two patients,
the mother and the fetu s? Should one carry out therapy or not, knowing
that it may harm the health or endanger the very life of the fetus?
Moreover, there is another question for those who also take into
consideration the possibility of abortion: can abortion be considered a form
of "therapy" for a mother with cancer?
Let us first study this last question. Abortion can never be justified,
even out of a desire to avoid harm to the health and life of the fetus (no
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harm can be more serious than an inflicted death) or out of fear that
continuation of pregnancy may accelerate the evolution of the maternal
pathology. Regarding this question, one can refer to studies carried out on
the association of pregnancy and breast cancer, which indicate that
pregnancy does not directly contribute to the development or to the
acceleration of breast cancer, although one must point out that the
physiological conditions of the breast during can delay diagnosis. 32 • 33. 34 It
has also been shown that sometimes when an abortion is suggested to
reduce gynecological pathologies, melanoma for example,35 the fetus is
actually the one in greater danger.
So how should the presence of cancer in pregnancy be managed ?
Three different situations can occur: 1) The therapeutic intervention can be
postponed until the end of pregnancy ; 2) The therapeutic intervention has
to be caITied out once the diagnosis has been made; 3) The mother refuses
any therapeutic intervention.
In the first situation, this would be a question of waiting for delivery,
which is sometimes anticipated as soon as the pulmonary maturity of the
fetus has been ascertained, in order to intervene medically and/or
surgically. This is the case, for example, of cervical cancer. It has been
shown that a mean delay of 16 weeks between the diagnosis of stage IE
cancer and the beginning of therapy, coinciding with delivery, did not
negatively influence the course of the di sease. 36 . 37
In the second situation, which is the most frequent one, a delay in
therapeutic intervention could accelerate the evolution of the disease also
with the risk of the woman 's death during pregnancy. That would mean the
loss of both mother and fetu s. Therefore, on one hand there is the need to
begin the therapy as soon as possible, and on the other hand, the
responsibility for the health and life of not only the mother, but of the fetus
as well.
In these situations, the therapeutic choice will have to be adapted to
the mother's clinical situation, although the physician will have to bear in
mind that there are forms of treatment that can harm the fetus, depending
on the phase of development reached. In fact, it is known that while there
are no contraindications for the use of anesthetics in pregnancy,
radiotherapy, even in extra-abdominal areas, can have an abortive or
teratogenic effect. Chemotherapy has different effects depending on the
period of the pregnancy: abortive and teratogenic effects during the first
trimester; induction of pre-term delivery, inter-uterine growth retardation ,
and the possible appearance of tumors in the fetus in the second and third
trimesters.38
On the other hand, some follow-ups demonstrate that there have
been no negative effects on fetuses whose mothers have undergone surgery
or who have been treated with chemotherapy in any trimester of
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pregnancy. 39, 40, 4 1, 42 Therefore it will be necessary to opt for the therapeutic
intervention that harms the fetus as little as possible but does not deprive
the mother of the necessary support.
One certainly cannot overlook that the therapy can harm the fetus or
even cause a miscarriage, but these occurrences can be justified from an
ethical point of view, even though they are not directly desired, This is
known as a double effect action; that is, in looking for the positive aim of
the action (curing the mother) and in the absence of other risk-free
remedies, one can accept the negative, foreseeable and inevitable effect
(disease or miscarriage) but this is not directly desired.
As previously mentioned, this double attention with respect to the
mother and the fetus often occurs only if the woman has decided to
proceed with the pregnancy, as though the existence of the fetus acquired
dignity following the mother's choice. Now, no one can deny that the
connection between the mother and her child is very strong. No one is in a
position to make the best choice for the mother. It is also true, however,
that it is the physician's duty to present the clinical reality of the case in the
most objective way possible so that the decision is made in full awareness.
In this clinical reality, one should also include the personal and
objective reality of the fetus, whose dignity should be recognized by
everyone and, above all, by the mother who is carrying him. She will
certainly bear the greatest weight of the decision, especially in the third
situation, the heroic decision not to undergo any therapy.
The "Subsequent" Responsibility
Finally, there is a last responsibility that concerns those who are
involved in assisting the patient. That is the management of suffering, the
unknown, the risks of the disease and the confrontation with death, all of
which require assistance in addition to medical, of a psychological or
spiritual nature, and is often lacking.
A study carried out at oncology centers in Norway on 600 patients
with tumors is indicative in this sense, since there is an increase in faith
following the disease (an increase of religiousness in 24% of cases). This
does not, however, correspond to a general provision of religious
assistance, which is only provided in 57% of cases and on request. 43 In fact,
there seems to be a strong need to give a sense to the disease, to pain and to
death, thus, the need for global assistance.
When this assistance is lacking, it is inevitable that there appears the
request to end one's existence, a request for euthanasia. And in fact, it is
hypocritical to think of justifying euthanasia in the name of excessive
technologicalization of medicine. There is a different reason. It is suffering
and death that frighten people; it is being abandoned that makes people
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vulnerable; it is the lack of charity and of solidarity by those assisting that
pushes people toward an extreme choice. Actually, since euthanasia is an
act totally against nature, one has the feeling that the patient's request is not
dictated by her desire, which changes with time,44 but is rather the
expression of a wish that is communicated, certainly not consciously or
verbally by those assisting, who have become consumed and tired of being
inert spectators to so much suffering, and who are unable to bear their own
fragility and that of others.
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